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We present a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with imperfect pub-
lic monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the
(limit) equilibrium payoﬀ set achieves full eﬃciency asymptotically as
the public signal becomes insensitive to the hidden actions of the play-
ers. The basic logic behind this result also provides an example where
the Folk theorem is obtained, while Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin’s suﬃ-
cient conditions (Econometrica 1994) for Folk theorem are violated.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring provide an analytical
framework to study long term relationships, where participants have im-
perfect public information about each other’s hidden action. Now well-
developed theory (including Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1] and Fuden-
berg, Levine, Maskin [7], FLM hereafter) shows how the participants can uti-
lize the imperfect information to achieve cooperation in such a setting. Our
intuition suggests that, as the observability of actions improves, it should
become easier to sustain cooperation. In fact, Kandori [8] has formalized
this idea, by showing that the equilibrium payoﬀ set expands, when observ-
ability improves according to the standard deﬁnition in statistical decision
theory (Blackwell and Girshick [3]). In this paper we point out a subtlety
in this issue and show that the above intuitive idea about observability and
cooperation should be taken with a pinch of salt. In particular, we present
a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, which has the following
seemingly paradoxical feature: the limit PPE payoﬀ set (limδ→1 E(δ))c a n
achieve full eﬃciency asymptotically as the public information becomes less
sensitive to the hidden actions of the players.1 The basic logic behind this
result also provides an example where the Folk theorem is obtained, while
FLM’s suﬃcient conditions for the Folk theorem are violated.
Our example is quite simple. We consider the standard prisoners’




where d,h > 0 (D is dominant) and d − h<1 ((C,C) is eﬃcient2). Ac-
tions are not observable3, but the players publicly observe a signal ω ∈
1Note that less information per se may not be a problem. If the quality of information
deteriorates at some action proﬁle, then deviation to the action proﬁle may be more
easily detected. A series of paper by E. Lehrer (such as [11],[12]) points out that such
distinguishability is the key for supporting more payoﬀs.
On the other hand, our paper illustrates that more payoﬀs can be supported as devia-
tions become seemingly less detectable
2This is the condition that (C,C) Pareto-dominates the public randomization between
(D,C) and (C,D) with an equal probability.
3We assume that the realized payoﬀ of a player is a function of his own action and
the public signal (so that a player cannot detect the opponent’s action simply by looking
at his realized payoﬀ), and we denote it by ui(ai,ω).T h e p a y o ﬀ table represents the
expected payoﬀ gi(a)=
P
ω∈Ω ui(ai,ω)p(ω|a),w h e r ep(ω|a) is the probability of ω given
2Ω ≡ {X,Y}. We suppose that the probability of signal ω given action pro-
ﬁle a ∈ {C,D}×{ C,D},d e n o t e dp(ω|a), is symmetric (i.e., p(ω|a1,a 2)=
p(ω|a2,a 1))a n ds a t i s ﬁes
p(X | C,C) <p (X | C,D),a n d
p(Y | D,C) <p (Y | D,D).
That is, one defection makes X more likely, while an additional defection
makes Y more likely.
We show that this familiar stage game exhibits the following paradoxical
feature: As the signal becomes insensitive to a deviation at the eﬃcient
point (C,C),( i . e . ,p(X | C,C) − p(X | D,C) → 0, holding p(X | D,D)
ﬁxed), the limit equilibrium payoﬀ set limδ→1 E(δ) expands and converges
to the set of all feasible and individually rational payoﬀs. (Here we denote
the public perfect equilibrium payoﬀ set in the repeated game under discount
factor δ by E(δ)). Moreover, this can be true even if observability is reduced
everywhere (not just at the eﬃcient point): as p(ω|a) for all ω and a
converges to one point (so that a deviation at any point becomes hard to
detect), the asymptotic payoﬀ set expands and converges to the set of all
feasible and individually rational payoﬀsa sl o n ga sp(X | C,C) − p(X |
D,C) converges to 0 faster than p(X | D,C) − p(X | D,D).
The mechanism operating behind our example is a familiar one (at least
to the specialists in repeated games). Our point is to show that the familiar
mechanism can operate in a subtle and disguised way. For this reason (and
just for fun) we pause here for a moment and ask the reader if s/he can see
how our example works. The answer is given in the next section and we
show how the trick is done.
2I n t u i t i v e E x p l a n a t i o n
The key for our result is the eﬃciency of asymmetric punishment. When
monitoring is imperfect, a “bad” outcome arises with a positive probability
even if no player deviates. To provide incentives to cooperate, a punishment
should be triggered in such an eventuality. If all players are simultaneously
punished (as in the trigger strategy), welfare loss is inevitable. However,
when each player’s action aﬀects the signal asymmetrically, we can use an
action proﬁle a. Throughout the paper we hold the expected payoﬀ ﬁxed when we change
the information structure p(ω|a). One can check that such an operation is possible with
a suitable choice of ui(ai,ω).
3asymmetric punishment scheme to avoid welfare loss; if player 1’s deviation
is suspected, we transfer 1’s future payoﬀ to player 2 (and vice versa). When
the discount factor δ is close to 1, such a transfer can be made in a close
vicinity of the Pareto frontier, and therefore the welfare loss vanishes as
δ → 1. Furthermore, this conclusion is independent of how informative the
signal is (as long as each player’s deviation aﬀects the signal asymmetrically).
This is the basic driving force in the FLM folk theorem [7].
In our example, each player’s action aﬀects the signal symmetrically at
the eﬃcient point (C,C) (each player’s deviation makes X more likely),
so that we are unable to use the eﬃcient asymmetric punishment at this
point. Hence, the above argument seemingly implies that eﬃciency cannot
be achieved. However, consider a nearby point (Dε,C),w h e r eDε denotes
the mixed strategy which plays C and D with probabilities (1−ε) and ε > 0
respectively. Player 1’s deviation to D makes X more likely at this point,
as at (C,C). What about player 2’s defection? The distribution of signal
when player 2 takes action a2 is given by
(1 − ε)p(ω|C,a2)+εp(ω|D,a2).
Now suppose that the ﬁrst term is suﬃciently insensitive to a2. Then,
player 2’s action aﬀects the signal mostly through the second term. As
p(Y |D,C) <p (Y |D,D), we conclude that player 2’s defection makes Y more
likely at this point. Hence, each player’s action aﬀects the signal asymmet-
rically at (Dε,C), so that the eﬃcient asymmetric punishment is feasible.4,5
Note that ε can be made arbitrarily small as the signal becomes insensitive
at the eﬃcient point (C,C). Hence, as observability decreases, the asym-
metric punishment becomes feasible at almost eﬃcient point (Dε,C) (and
symmetrically at (C,Dε)). This is the source of eﬃciency in our examples.
Hence, the crux of the matter is the feasibility of asymmetric punishment,
not the amount of information per se. The twist of our example is that
the former is attained in a neighborhood of the eﬃcient action proﬁle (C,C)
only when the observability of actions is decreased (in a broad sense).
Now let us make the above argument more precise. At (Dε,C),t h e
4A basic idea behind this construction is that a monitoring structure can be improved
by utilizing an ineﬃcient action proﬁle. This general idea is also the main theme of our
related paper [10].
5L e m m a6 . 3i nF u d n e b e r g ,L e v i n e ,a n dM a s k i n[ 7 ]a l s oe m p l o y sam i x e da c t i o nt o
sustain an eﬃcient outcome which may not be otherwise sustainable. Mixed strategies
also play an important role in the literature of repeated games with private monitoring
such as Sekiguchi [14], Bhaskar and Obara [2], Piccione [13], and Ely and Välimäki [5].
4change in the probability of Y when player 2 deviates is equal to
(1 − ε)[p(Y |C,D) − p(Y |C,C)] + ε[p(Y |D,D) − p(Y |D,C)]. (1)
If this expression is positive, player 2’s defection at (Dε,C) makes Y more
likely, so that each player’s action aﬀects the signal asymmetrically, as we
desire. The above expression (1) can be rearranged as
−(1 − ε)ξ + ε∆
where ξ ≡ p(X|C,D)−p(X|C,C) > 0 and ∆ ≡ p(Y |D,D)−p(Y |D,C) > 0.





Given ξ > 0 and ∆ > 0, this inequality provides a lower bound on the prob-
ability of D. Hence (Dε,C) is bounded away from the eﬃcient action proﬁle
(C,C) when the eﬃcient asymmetric punishment is employed. However,
this lower bound vanishes when the observability of a deviation at (C,C) is
reduced (i.e., ξ → 0). Furthermore, the same is true even when the observ-
ability of action is reduced everywhere (i.e., ξ → 0 and ∆ → 0)a sl o n ga s∆
converges to 0 at a slower rate than ξ. Thus we can employ an asymmetric
punishment which approximates the eﬃcient action proﬁle (C,C) arbitrarily
closely as ξ → 0 for such ∆.6
Although this is the essence of our argument, we should address other
non-trivial issues to obtain the formal proof. First, when supporting ((1 −
ε)C + εD,C), player 1 must be indiﬀerent between C and D. This indif-
ference condition determines the level of transfer between 1 and 2 in the
eﬃcient asymmetric punishment. In general, this transfer may not be suﬃ-
cient to deter player 2’s deviation. We will show7 that this does not happen
when ξ → 0 and ξ/∆ → 0. Second, we need to show that the continuation
payoﬀs in the asymmetric punishment are also sustained by the repeated
game equilibria. The detailed analysis is given in the next section.
Lastly, let us comment on the relationship of our result to the folk the-
orem under imperfect public monitoring (FLM [7]). Our example does not
satisfy the FLM conditions for the folk theorem for each ξ > 0 and neither
6On the other hand, if ξ/4 is bounded away from 0, then the public signal distribution
always moves in the same direction whoever is deviating to D in a small enough neighbor-
hood of (C,C). This implies that asymmetric punishments cannot be used around (C,C),
hence the eﬃcient outcome cannot be approximated by any PPE in this case.
7 A detailed verbal explanation is provided in Case 3 of the proof of Lemma 2.
5in the limit ξ → 0. Their pairwise full rank condition requires that there is











has rank 3. Obviously this is impossible, because this matrix has only
two columns. However, our example is based on the fundamental idea of
FLM, the eﬃciency of asymmetric punishment. The point here is that the
pairwise full rank condition is a suﬃcient condition to facilitate the eﬃcient
asymmetric punishment, but it is not necessary. The essence of our example
is that (i) the eﬃcient asymmetric punishment is feasible at some points,
even though the pairwise full rank condition fails, and (ii) those points can
be arbitrarily close to the eﬃcient point, as the observability is reduced.
This suggests that we may obtain the folk theorem without the pairwise full
rank condition. In fact, we show in Section 5 that we can modify this model
to obtain a fairly simple example which satisﬁes the folk theorem without
the pairwise full rank condition.
We present the formal statement of our result and its proof in the next
section and generalize it to a more general class of stage games. Then we
oﬀer some discussion on its implication on the the folk theorem in Section
5 and Kandori [8] in the last section.
3A n a l y s i s
We denote player i0s expected payoﬀ given a ∈ A = A1 ×A2 by gi (a), and,
by abusing notation, gi (α) for player i0s expected payoﬀ g i v e nam i x e da c t i o n
proﬁle α ∈ 4A1 ×4 A2. Let V ∗ be the individually rational and feasible
set, i.e. V ∗ = {v ∈ Cog(A)|v ≥ 0},w h e r eC o g(A) denotes the convex hull of
set g(A)={v|v = g(a),a∈ A}. Note that in the prisoners’ dilemma game
we consider, 0 is the minimax payoﬀ for each player.
We use the Fudenberg and Levine’s algorithm to compute the asymptotic
(perfect public) equilibrium payoﬀ set ([6]). Let us brieﬂy summarize their
method for readers’ convenience. For a given welfare weight vector λ ∈
<2Â{0} a n dam i x e da c t i o np r o ﬁle α,l e tk∗ (α,λ) be the maximized value
for the following static optimization problem8.
8This is a bit diﬀerent from their exposition. We used the fact that v =( 1−δ)g(α)+
6maxvi,xi(·),i=1,2 λ · (g (α)+E [x(ω)|α]) subject to
∀i∀ai gi (α)+E [xi (ω)|α] ≥ gi (ai,α−i)+E [xi (ω)|ai,α−i]
and the equality holds for ai ∈suppαi
∀ωλ· x(ω) ≤ 0
where suppαi is the support of αi. Roughly speaking, the term x in the
above optimization problem represents the variation in continuation payoﬀs,
and the constraint λ · x(ω) ≤ 0 ensures that the payoﬀ variations lie in
the equilibrium payoﬀ set. Let k∗ (λ)=s u p α k∗ (α,λ) and H (λ) be the
half-space given by
©
v ∈ <2|λ · v ≤ k∗ (λ)
ª
. Let Q = ∩λ∈<2Â{0}H (λ),a n d
denote the set of perfect public equilibrium9 payoﬀs for discount factor δ by
E(δ). Then Fudenberg and Levine [6] proved the following:
F-L Algorithm: Q =l i m δ→1 E (δ) when Q has an interior point.
Let us parametrize the information structure by
ξ ≡ p(X|C,D) − p(X|C,C) > 0,a n d
∆(ξ) ≡ p(Y |D,D) − p(Y |D,C) > 0
while p(ω|C,C) is ﬁxed. To indicate explicitly the dependence of Q in
the above result on the parameter ξ,w ed e n o t ei tb yQ(ξ).W e e x a m i n e
how Q(ξ) is aﬀected by ξ. For each ξ, we can show that Q(ξ) is a strict
subset of V ∗. In particular, it is bounded away from the eﬃcient payoﬀ
proﬁle (1,1). However, we show that Q(ξ) expands and supports almost
all individually rational payoﬀ proﬁle as ξ converges to 0 as long as ∆(ξ)
is bounded away from 0 or converges to 0 at a slower rate.T h e r e f o r e f u l l
eﬃciency is achieved only in the limit as ξ → 0. One example of such
information structure would be p(X | C,C)=1 /2 and ∆(ξ)=ξ +1 /4
(so that p(Y | D,D)=3 /4 is constant). Another example would be p(X
δE[u(ω)|α] is equivalent to v = g(α)+E[x(ω)|α] for x(ω)=
δ
1−δ(u(ω) − v) (the former is
obtained by the latter multiplied by (1 − δ)).
9Perfect public equilibrium is sequential equilibrium where each player’s action depends
only on the history of publicly observable signals.
7| C,C)=1 /2 and ∆(ξ)=
√
ξ (so that p(ω|a) → 1/2 for all ω and a,a s
ξ → 0). Now we prove the following result. Recall that E(δ) is the set of
perfect public equilibrium payoﬀs under discount factor δ.N o t e a l s o t h a t ,
for any δ0 ∈ (0,1),E (δ0) is contained in limδ→1 E(δ).10
Theorem 1 For each ξ > 0, the equilibrium payoﬀs are bounded away from
the eﬃcient point (1,1); there is a neighborhood of (1,1) which lies outside of
limδ→1 E (δ). However, as the signal becomes less sensitive to actions (ξ →
0),t h ei n e ﬃciency vanishes and we can sustain all feasible and individually
rational payoﬀs (limδ→1 E (δ) → V ∗ as ξ → 0),w h e nl i m ξ→0
ξ
∆(ξ) =0 .1112
We need to mention that, although limδ→1 E (δ) converges to V ∗ as ξ →
0, we do not know whether it expands to V ∗ monotonically as ξ → 0.
The proof of this theorem is given by the Fudenberg-Levine Algorithm
and the following Lemmata.
Lemma 1 (1,1) / ∈ Q(ξ) for any ξ > 0.
Lemma 2 limξ→0 Q(ξ)=V ∗ if limξ→0
ξ
∆(ξ) =0 .
Note that Lemma 1 immediately implies the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1,
because Q(ξ)(=l i m δ→1 E (δ)) is closed (as it is an intersection of closed
half-spaces). The proof of Lemma 1 is conceptually quite simple. To
sustain a point near (1,1), the players need to play C with a suﬃciently
large probability, which implies that each player’s defection makes X more
likely. This means that both players should be punished when X arises.
As this entails welfare loss, it is impossible to sustain any point near (1,1).
This intuitive argument can be formalized as follows.
10See Fudenberg and Levine ([6]), Theorem 3.1.
11Thus the order of the limits matters. For example, take a sequence of ξ such that
ξ → 0, ∆(ξ) → 0 and limξ→0
ξ
∆(ξ) =0 . We have limξ→0 limδ→1 E (δ)=V
∗, while
limδ→1 limξ→0 E (δ) is (0,0) because E (δ)=( 0 ,0) at ξ =0for any δ.
12This theorem also implies that eﬃciency may be improved as information gets worse
for a given discount factor. More precisely, we can ﬁnd ξ and ξ




∆(ξ) and δ such that, for any ﬁxed δ ∈ (δ,1), aP P E p a y o ﬀ with ξ
0 is closer to (1,1) than
any PPE payoﬀ with ξ.
8Proof of Lemma 1: It is suﬃcient to demonstrate (1,1) / ∈ H((1,1)).
Recall that this is equivalent to








where the supremum is taken over α and x such that α is enforced by x which
satisﬁes x1(ω)+x2 (ω) ≤ 0 for all ω. Recall that Dε denotes the behavior
strategy which plays D with probability ε.L e t ε00 be the minimum ε such
that p(X|Dε,D) ≤ p(X|Dε,C),a n dl e tM ≡ {α|αi(D) ≥ ε00 (ξ) for at least
one i =1 ,2}.N o t e t h a t ε00 (ξ)=
ξ
ξ+∆(ξ) > 0 by assumption. Then there











i=1 xi(ω) ≤ 0 for all ω. Hence, (2) is proved if we show that there is
another constant K0 > 0 such that for all α / ∈ M




Note that, when α / ∈ M,e a c hp l a y e rp l a y sD with probability less than
ε00 (ξ). This means that, by the deﬁnition of ε00 (ξ), any player’s deviation
makes X more likely, so that both players should be punished when X is
realized. Player 1’s incentive constraint is
d ≤ {p(X|D,α2) − p(X|C,α2)}(x1 (Y ) − x1 (X)),
and by using this we can obtain an upper bound for g1(α)+E[x1(ω)|α]:
g1 (C,α2)+E [x1 (ω)|C,α2]
= g1 (C,α2)+x1 (Y ) − p(X|C,α2)(x1 (Y ) − x1 (X))





p(X|C,α2) > 1 is the likelihood ratio given α2. Similarly, we can
obtain g2 (α1,C)+x2 (Y )− d
Lα1−1 as an upper bound for g2(α)+E[x2(ω)|α].
These inequalities, together with the constraint
P2



















for any α / ∈ M and x, where L ≡
p(X|D,C)
p(X|C,C). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : To establish the claim we will identify certain point(s)
contained in the half-space H(λ) for each direction λ 6=0 . A convex-hull
of such points provides a subset of Q(ξ), and we will show that this subset
tends to V ∗ as ξ → 0.
Case 1, λ1,λ2 ≤ 0 and λ 6=0 : (0,0) ∈ H (λ).
This is true because Nash equilibrium (0,0) is sustained by xi ≡ 0,
i =1 ,2. Note that the above claim implies ∩λ1,λ2≤0,λ6=0H (λ) ⊃ <2
+ ≡
{v ∈ <2|vi ≥ 0}.
Case 2, λ1 > 0,λ2 ≤ 0: g(D,C) ∈ H(λ).
This is established by showing that (D,C) is enforceable while λ·x(ω)=
0 is satisﬁed. This is an easy case, because any player’s deviation at this
point makes Y more likely, and λ1 > 0,λ2 ≤ 0 implies that the sidepayment
scheme x can punish both players when Y arises without any welfare loss13
(i.e., λ · x(ω)=0 ) . The incentive constraints are
g1 (D,C)+E [x1 (ω)|D,C] ≥ g1 (C,C)+E [x1 (ω)|C,C]
g2 (D,C)+E [x2 (ω)|D,C] ≥ g2 (D,D)+E [x2 (ω)|D,D],
13Precisely speaking, when λ2 =0 ,t h ee ﬃcient punishment condition λ·x ≡ 0 requires
that player 1 receives no punishment (x1 ≡ 0). However, this is not a problem, as player
1 is taking a myopic best reply at (D,C).
10which reduce to
d ≥ ξ (x1 (Y ) − x1 (X))
h ≤ ∆(ξ)(x2 (X) − x2 (Y )).
First, λ·x(ω)=0can be satisﬁed by setting x1 (Y )=x2 (Y )=0 ,x 1 (X)=
−λ2
λ1x2 (X). The incentive constraints are satisﬁed by taking x2 (X) large
enough, because −λ2
λ1 is non-negative. Therefore (D,C) is achieved without
any eﬃciency loss, which implies g(D,C) ∈ H(λ).
Recall that Dε denotes a mixed action proﬁle where D is played with
probability ε. With this notation, we show the following.
Case 314, λ1 ≥ λ2 > 0: For a ﬁxed ε ∈ (0,1), we have
g(Dε0,C) ∈ H(λ)
for all ε0 ∈ [ε,1] if
ξ
∆(ξ) is suﬃciently small.
Before going into the formal proof, let us provide some intuition. We ﬁrst
discuss the case ε0 6=1so that player 1 is mixing C and D. Calculation shows
that, if ε0 >
ξ
ξ+∆(ξ), the proﬁtable deviation (to D)b ye a c hp l a y e ra ﬀects
the signal asymmetrically. That is, defection by 1 makes X more likely,
while defection by 2 makes Y more likely. Hence, to deter the proﬁtable
deviations, we may transfer payoﬀ from 2 to 1 when Y arises and vice versa.
This causes no welfare loss ( λ · x(ω)=0 ).
However, this is not the end of the story, because 1 should be indiﬀerent
between C and D.T h i s i n d i ﬀerence condition determines the magnitude of
the transfer x,a n di ts h o u l db es u ﬃciently large to deter player 2’s defection.
Given such limited resource for punishment for player 2, the signal must not
be too insensitive to 2’s defection. Since the signal becomes completely
insensitive to 2’s action when the mixing probability ε0 is exactly equal to
ξ
ξ+∆(ξ), ε0 must be larger than
ξ
ξ+∆(ξ) by some bounded amount. If
ξ
∆(ξ)
is small enough, we can guarantee that such condition is satisﬁed for any
ε0 ∈ [ε,1].
Finally, the case ε0 =1can be treated as a special case of the above
construction (although a much simpler argument works, because player 1
14Symmetric arguments apply to the remaining case: λ2 ≥ λ1 > 0.
11need not be indiﬀerent between C and D in this case). This completes the
intuitive explanation, and now let us provide the formal proof for Case 3.
The incentive constraints are
d = ξ (x1 (Y ) − x1 (X)) (1 is indiﬀerent), and
εh +( 1− ε)d ≤ {p(Y |Dε,D) − p(Y |Dε,C)}(x2 (X) − x2 (Y ))
= {−(1 − ε)ξ + ε∆(ξ)}(x2 (X) − x2 (Y )) (2 does not want to play D).
These constraints and λ·x(ω)=0for ω ∈ (X,Y) are satisﬁed, if we choose
x1 (X)=0 ,x 1 (Y )=d
ξ,x 2 (X)=0 , and x2 (Y )=−λ1
λ2
d
ξ. As for the second
constraint, the RHS satisﬁes
{−(1 − ε)ξ + ε∆(ξ)}(x2 (X) − x2 (Y ))












(because λ1 ≥ λ2 > 0).
Since
ξ+∆(ξ)
ξ blows up as
ξ
∆(ξ) → 0, the second inequality is also satisﬁed if
ξ
∆(ξ) is small enough.15 Hence, for given ε > 0,g(Dε0,C) ∈ H(λ) holds for
any ε0 ∈ [ε,1] as
ξ
∆(ξ) → 0.
Our analysis of Case 3 makes it clear that, for any sequence of ξ → 0
such that
ξ
∆(ξ) → 0, we can ﬁnd a sequence ε0 (ξ) ∈ (0,1) such that ε0 (ξ) → 0
















where Co denotes the convex hull (see Figure A). The reader can verify
from the ﬁgure that Q(ξ) ⊂ H(λ) for each case discussed above (Case 1 is
depicted in the ﬁgure).
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Note that Q(ξ) → V ∗as ξ → 0, because ε0(ξ) → 0. This and the fact
Q(ξ)=l i m δ→1 E (δ) ⊂ V ∗ prove Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
4 A Generalization
The core of our example is that an action arbitrarily close to the eﬃcient
point can be supported by transfers of continuation payoﬀsa c r o s sp l a y e r s ,
when the signal becomes uninformative at the eﬃcient point. Now we show
that a similar construction is possible for a class of games which are more
general than the prisoners’ dilemma.
Our generalized model has many actions and many signal outcomes.
The stage game is symmetric and has a symmetric eﬃcient point (a1,a 1),
which is not a Nash equilibrium. By symmetry, each player’s deviation
at this point aﬀects the signal in a symmetric way, so there is no way to
enforce this outcome by transfer of payoﬀs across players (i.e. the only way
to enforce the eﬃcient action proﬁle is to punish the players simultaneously,
when a “bad” outcome arises.). However, a point close to the eﬃcient point,
((1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am,a 1), where player 1 is mixing some action am with a
small probability, is shown to be enforced by transfer, when the signal is
13suﬃciently insensitive at the eﬃcient point.16,17
The public signal takes on H diﬀerent values ω ∈ Ω = {ω1,...,ωH}.A s
in our previous example, we assume that the signal space is too small for the
FLM folk theorem to hold. Recall that the pairwise full rank condition of
FLM is satisﬁed only if |Ω| ≥ |A1|+|A2|−1, or in our notation, H ≥ 2K−1.
Hence we assume H<2K − 1. On the other hand, we assume that the
number of signal outcomes are not too small, so that the individual full
rank condition is satisﬁed (at the eﬃcient point). To state this assumption,
consider a row vector of signal distribution given action proﬁle a,
p(a) ≡ (p(ω1|a),...,p(ωH|a)).
The individual full rank condition is satisﬁed at the eﬃcient point when
vectors p(a1,a 1),...,p(aH,a 1) are linearly independent18. Note that this is
satisﬁed in our prisoner’s dilemma example.
Now let dk ≡ g1(ak,a 1) − g1(a1,a 1) be the gain from deviation to the
kth action at the eﬃcient point. We ﬁrst identify a transfer scheme x1(ω)
(in the Fudenberg-Levine algorithm) for player 1 which makes her indiﬀer-
ent among all actions. In particular, we ﬁnd such a transfer x1(ω) that
g1(ak,a 1)+E[x1(ω)|ak,a 1] is constant for all k. This provides an incentive













p(a1,a 1) − p(a2,a 1)
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d = P(a1)x1. (3)
This condition states that the gain from any deviation (the left hand side) is
exactly balanced with the loss in the expected transfer (the right hand side).
Note that the argument of matrix P(·), a1, denotes the opponent’s action
that is ﬁxed. Now we ﬁx a base information structure P(·) and assume that
the public signal becomes insensitive to actions at the eﬃcient point. To
this end, we consider a family of distributions parametrized by ξ,
Pξ(a1)=ξP(a1)
16We denote by (1 − ε) ◦ a
1 + ε ◦ a
m a mixed action which plays a
1 and a
m with
probabilities (1 − ε) and ε respectively.
17This result does not guarantee that an almost eﬃcient payoﬀ is sustained by a PPE.
We also need to show that asymmetric action proﬁles can be supported without sacriﬁcing
much eﬃciency. However such detail is omitted.
18To satisfy this condition, we need K ≤ H. We only stated the condition for player
1, but by our symmetry assumption the same condition holds for player 2.
14and let ξ → 0, while holding the distributions elsewhere constant (i.e.,
Pξ(ak)=P(ak) for k 6=1 ). This embodies the idea that the signal becomes
uninformative only at the eﬃcient point (a1,a 1).L e t x1 be a solution to
d = P(a1)x1, which exists because of the individual full rank condition (the
rows of matrix P(a1) are linearly independent). Clearly, x1 = 1
ξx1 is a
solution to the incentive equation (3) for P(a1)=Pξ(a1)=ξP(a1).
Our central assumption in this generalized example is that there is an
action am where (p(am,a 1) − p(am,a k))x1 < 0 for all k =2 ,...K.T h a t
is, when player 1 is taking action am, any deviation by player 2 from the
eﬃcient action a1 increases the expected value of the transfer x1 that we
have constructed above (recall that x1 is a transfer which induces player 1 to
choose any mixed action), In our prisoner’s dilemma example, this condition
is satisﬁed with am = D. In vector-matrix notation, our assumption is
expressed as19
P(am)x1 ¿ 0. (4)
Now we are ready to demonstrate that, for any ﬁxed small number ε > 0,
a mixed action proﬁle close to the eﬃcient point, ((1−ε)◦a1+ε◦am,a 1),i s
enforced by a transfer, when the signal becomes suﬃciently uninformative
at the eﬃcient point (i.e., ξ is suﬃciently small). More precisely, for
any given set of positive welfare weights λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0,w ec o n s t r u c ta
transfer scheme (x1(ω),x 2(ω)) such that (i) λ1x1(ω)+λ2x2(ω)=0for all ω,
a n d( i i )w h e ne a c hp l a y e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ is given by gi(a)+E[xi(ω)|a], the proﬁle
((1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am,a 1) is a Nash equilibrium.
Let x1 = 1
ξx1. We have already seen that player 1 has an incentive
to play any mixed action (and therefore to play the speciﬁed mixed action
(1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am). Deﬁne x2 to satisfy λ1x1 + λ2x2 =0 .N a m e l y ,
let x2 = − λ1
λ2ξx1. Now consider how much player 2 can gain in the stage
game when she deviates from a1 to ak (while player 1 is taking mixed action
(1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am). This is given by
dk
2 ≡ g2((1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am,a k) − g2((1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am,a 1),
and we deﬁne a column vector of gains by d2 ≡ (d2
2,...,d K
2 )>. The equilib-
rium condition for player 2 speciﬁes that those gains should be wiped out
by the reduction of expected transfer, and in our notation it is expressed as
d2 ≤ Pξ((1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am)x2. (5)
19Recall tha the kth row of matrix P(a




m),w h i c h





15Note that the right hand side represents the reductions in the expected value
of transfer x2 which are associated with player 2’s deviations, when player
1 is playing mixed action (1 − ε) ◦ a1 + ε ◦ am. The right hand side of this


















Under our assumption (4), the last term in the last line is a positive vector,
and it diverges as ξ → 0. In contrast, the ﬁrst term in the last line is
constant. Therefore, we conclude that the incentive condition for player 2
(inequality (5)) is satisﬁed for suﬃciently small ξ.
Remark: We could weaken the crucial assumption (4) by
P(α0)x1 ¿ 0.
for some mixed action α0 whose support is contained in {a2,...,a K}. Exactly
the same proof goes through. Note that this condition is easier to satisfy
than the original one.
5 A Simple Example of the Folk Theorem without
t h eP a i r w i s eF u l lR a n kC o n d i t i o n
Besides providing the paradoxical result, our examples also point out a plau-
sibility that eﬃciency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring is ob-
tained under a much weaker conditions than is identiﬁed by the FLM folk
theorem. In this section we elaborate on this issue, which is another point
we would like to make with our examples.
The feasibility of eﬃcient asymmetric punishment is the basic driving
force of the FLM folk theorem, and one of the suﬃcient conditions to fa-
cilitate asymmetric punishment is the pairwise full rank condition. As we
have seen in Sections 3 and 4, however, the preceding models have the prop-
erty that the pairwise full rank condition is not satisﬁed but asymmetric
punishment is feasible. This suggests that we may obtain the folk theorem
under a weaker set of assumptions. In fact, a minor modiﬁcation of our
ﬁrst example provides a fairly simple example where the folk theorem holds
without the pairwise full rank condition. This is shown by an argument
which closely follows our method of proofs in Section 3.
16Suppose that we have the same stage game payoﬀ (the prisoners’ dilemma)












It is not diﬃcult to check that the FLM pairwise full rank condition is
violated at any pure action proﬁle because there are only two public sig-
nals.20 Nonetheless, the basic idea behind FLM is still valid. For example,
consider (C,C). It is possible to distinguish diﬀerent players’ deviations
here; X is more likely if player 1 deviates, and Y is more likely if player
2 deviates (assuming that ξ is positive). Therefore eﬃcient punishments
based on transfer of utility (á la FLM) can still be employed to support the
eﬃcient action proﬁle without any eﬃciency loss.
The more tricky part is to support the asymmetric proﬁles with respect
to a variety of hyperplanes. For example, consider another eﬃcient point
(D,C). At this point, either player’s deviation makes Y more likely, so that
asymmetric punishment is not feasible. However, since player 1’s deviation
(to C)i sunproﬁtable, we may be able to transfer, without violating the
incentive constraints, player 2’s continuation payoﬀ to player 1,w h e nY is
realized. We have to check if this transfer from 2 to 1, which makes player
1’s deviation to C more attractive, is not too large to wipe out the loss
associated with the unproﬁtable deviation to C. It turns out that we can
overcome this potential problem by the particular payoﬀ structure of the
Prisoners’ dilemma (see Case 2 in the proof).
The enforceability of a given action proﬁle on various hyperplanes is
the core to achieve the folk theorem. FLM’s pairwise full rank condition
ensures this by requiring that the linear combinations of relevant signal
distributions are distinct. Kandori and Matsushima [9] pointed out that
this can be weakened by requiring that the convex combinations of relevant
signal distributions are distinct. An essential condition of theirs is satisﬁed
at (C,C) in our example21.T h i s f a i l s a t (D,C) and (C,D),h o w e v e r ,a s
20Indeed a weaker condition, pairwise identiﬁability condition ([7]), is violated at all the
pure action proﬁles. On the other hand, the individual full rank condition is satisﬁed at
every pure action proﬁle.









2 −ξ) (those vectors represent (probability of X,p r o b a -
17either player’s deviation creates the same distribution. Still, those points
can be enforced on hyperplanes as we argued above, because of the special
payoﬀ structure. This suggests that we can obtain even a weaker set of
conditions for the enforceability on hyperplanes, by imposing restrictions
jointly on the information structure and the deviation payoﬀs. This issue
i sb e i n ga d d r e s s e di nw o r ki np r e p a r a t i o nb yH a r r i s o nC h e n g[ 4 ] .
Now we are ready to prove the following result.
Theorem 2 The model in this section violates the pairwise full rank condi-
tion but the folk theorem holds; for any ξ > 0, limδ→1 E (δ)=V ∗
Proof: We continue to use the Fudenberg-Levine Algorithm and demon-
strate Q(ξ)(= limδ→1 E (δ)) = V ∗.
Case 1, λ1,λ2 ≤ 0 and λ 6=0 : (0,0) ∈ H (λ).
This case is obvious.
Case 2, λ1 > 0, λ2
λ1 ≤ d
1+h: g(D,C) ∈ H(λ) (For such λ, λ · g (a) is
maximized by (D,C))
This is established by showing that (D,C) is enforceable while λ·x(ω)=
0 is satisﬁed. The incentive constraints are
g1 (D,C)+E [x1 (ω)|D,C] ≥ g1 (C,C)+E [x1 (ω)|C,C]
g2 (D,C)+E [x2 (ω)|D,C] ≥ g2 (D,D)+E [x2 (ω)|D,D]
which reduce to
d ≥ ξ (x1 (Y ) − x1 (X))
h ≤ ξ (x2 (X) − x2 (Y )).
The equality λ · x(ω)=0can be satisﬁed by setting x1 (Y )=x2 (Y )=0 ,
x1 (X)=−λ2





h ≤ ξx2 (X).





















2 + ξ) are
linearly dependent (so that the pairwise full rank condition fails).
18If λ2 ≤ 0, these constraints can be satisﬁed by taking x2 (X) large enough.
So suppose not. Then we can ﬁnd a x2 (X) to satisfy these inequalities if and
only if λ2
λ1h ≤ d, w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed because λ2
λ1 ≤ d
1+h by assumption.
Case 3, λ1,λ2 > 0: g (C,C) ∈ H(λ).
The incentive constraints are
d ≤ ξ (x1 (Y ) − x1 (X))
d ≤ ξ (x2 (X) − x2 (Y )).
These can be satisﬁed by, for example, x1 (Y )=x2 (Y )=0 ,x 1 (X)=
−λ2
λ1x2 (X) by taking x2 (X) large enough while λ · x(ω)=0is satisﬁed.
Note that the symmetric argument of Case 2 applies to the remaining
case: λ2 > 0, λ1
λ2 ≤ d
1+h. For this case, the incentive constraints are
h ≤ ξ (x1 (Y ) − x1 (X))
d ≥ ξ (x2 (X) − x2 (Y )).
Then we can set x1 (X)=x2 (X)=0and x2 (Y )=−λ1
λ2x1 (Y ) and show
that g (C,D) ∈ H(λ) for such λ. Combining all these cases, it is clear that
we have Q(ξ)=V ∗. Q.E.D.
6 Relationship to the Blackwell-Monotonicity
The example in Section 3 (and Section 4) seemingly contradicts Kandori [8],
which shows that the equilibrium payoﬀ set becomes smaller when observ-
ability is reduced in Blackwell’s sense. In this section we explain the precise
relationship between our example and Kandori [8].
Recall that a signal ω0 is less informative than ω in Blackwell’s sense,





ω∈Ω q(ω0|ω) p(ω|a) for each ω ∈ Ω (where p0 (ω0|a) and p(ω|a)
denote the associated distribution functions). When this condition holds,
we say that ω0 is a garbling of ω. It is easy to see that, when public
randomization device is available, any equilibrium strategy under the less
informative signal ω0 can be mimicked under the better signal ω.T h i s i s
because the players can garble the signal by themselves via public random-
ization device. Inspection of the equilibrium conditions immediately shows
19that the strategy proﬁle thus constructed is also an equilibrium under the
better signal ω. Hence, when ω0 is a garbling of ω,w eh a v eEω0(δ) j Eω(δ)
for any δ ∈ [0,1),w h e r eEω0(δ) and Eω(δ) denote the public perfect equilib-
rium payoﬀ sets under signal ω0 and ω. Kandori’s results [8] are built on
this observation. Kandori pointed out that the same is true without public
randomization when the signal is a continuous variable, and he went on to
show Eω0(δ) j Eω(δ) under certain regularity conditions.
To demonstrate the precise relationship between those observations and
our example, we now show that a similar result is obtained (without public
randomization) in the current setting (i.e., with the ﬁnite signal space) in
the limit (δ → 1).L e t Qω0 and Qω be the limit equilibrium payoﬀ set Q
(=l i m δ→1 E(δ)) associated with ω0 and ω respectively.
Proposition 1 If ω0 is a garbling of ω,Q ω0 j Qω.
Proof: Take any feasible (α0,x 0) for the optimization problem with p0 for
direction λ.C o n s i d e r (α0,x) where x is deﬁned by x(ω)=
P
ω0∈Ω q(ω0|ω)x0 (ω0).
Then (α0,x) is feasible for the optimization problem with p for the direc-
tion λ because the feasible set of x is convex and the incentive constraints
are automatically satisﬁed. Moreover, it is also clear that (α0,x) achieves
the same value as (α0,x 0). This implies that Hp0 (λ) ⊂ Hp (λ) for any λ,
therefore Qω0 j Qω.Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 logically implies that, although our signalling structure
gets “less informative” as ξ → 0, it does not so in the sense of Blackwell.
In fact, it is not so diﬃcult to see that, in the limit, the assumption for
Theorem 1 (limξ→0
ξ
∆(ξ) =0 ) precludes a signalling structure which is less
informative by Blackwell’s criterion.
Suppose that pn+1 is a garbling of pn for n =0 ,1,...and kpn (·|CD) − pn (·|CC)k
converges to 0 as n →∞ ,w h e r ep0 (ω|a)=p(ω|a). Since pn+1 (·|a)=
Anpn (·|a) where An is a matrix deﬁned by
An =
µ
qn (X|X) qn (X|Y )
qn (Y |X) qn (Y |Y )
¶
for some qn (·|·), we have
pn+1 (·|a)=An...A1A0p(·|a)
Let An = An...A1A0.S i n c e limn→∞ kAn (p1 (·|CD) − p1 (·|CC))k =0 ,i t





1 − x 1 − x
¶
20for some x ∈ [0,1] as long as kp1 (·|CD) − p1 (·|CC)k > 0. This implies that
kpn (·|DD) − pn (·|DC)k also converges to 0, and, moreover, kpn (·|CD) − pn (·|CC)k
and kpn (·|DD) − pn (·|DC)k converge to 0 at the same speed.22 This is in
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